























































































































































































What are the basic principles underlying the design of optimal monetary
policies among open and interdependent economies? From the recent policy
and academic debate, it is far from obvious that monetary policy should have
any `international' dimension at all. In fact, there is little or no consensus
on such questions as of whether domestic monetary policy should react to
exchange rate ­uctuations and overseas macroeconomic developments; what
role is played by external factors in the choice between di«erent rules, and
between rules and discretion in policy-making; what (if anything) can be
achieved through international cooperation and `global compacts' with trad-
ing partners.
This paper presents a baseline general-equilibrium framework to assess
these issues and provide some tentative answers. The paper shares the unify-
ing research agenda of most recent contributions on optimal monetary policy,
and adopts a common methodology based upon choice-theoretic stochastic
models with nominal rigidities, imperfect competition in production, and
forward-looking price-setting.1 Our main results can be summarized as fol-
lows.
First, inward-looking monetary policies that do not react to world cyclical
conditions cannot be optimal for an open economy in which ¬rms' pro¬ts are
exposed to exchange rate ­uctuations. Recent literature has stressed that,
in a closed economy with nominal rigidities, it is desirable to pursue a policy
that closes the output gap completely.2 In fact, if one can disregard real
rigidities and `cost-push' in­ation, such policy can replicate the allocation
that would prevail if prices where fully ­exible. In an open economy, however,
a policy attempting to close the domestic output gap could induce excessive
volatility in the exchange rate, a«ecting foreign exporters' pro¬ts. Risk-
averse foreign producers would then hedge against the risk of losses in their
1The literature on monetary rules in open economy has boomed in recent years. A
far from complete list of theoretical contributions includes Ball [1999], Benigno and Be-
nigno [2000], Benigno, Benigno and Ghironi [2000], Carlstrom and Fuerst [1999], Clarida,
Gali and Gertler [2001], Devereux and Engle [2000], Gali and Monacelli [1999], Ghironi
and Rebucci [2000], Leitmo and SÁ oderstrÁ om [2000], McCallum and Nelson [1999], Mona-
celli [1999], Obstfeld and Rogo« [2000b], Parrado and Velasco [2000], Sutherland [2000],
Svensson [2000], and Walsh [1999].
2See for instance Gali [2000], Goodfriend and King [2000] and Woodford [2000].
1export market by charging higher prices in domestic currency, thus reducing
the purchasing power of domestic consumers.
Only when markups are independent of exchange rate movements the
optimal domestic policy does not react to policy shocks and cyclical con-
ditions in the world economy. This may be the case, for instance, when
goods are produced with domestic inputs only and are priced in the produc-
ers' currency, or when exporters are fully insured against currency volatility.
Otherwise, relative to an inward-looking policy conduct, the domestic policy
maker can improve welfare by trading o«, at the margin, a larger domestic
output gap against lower import prices. To act in the best interest of do-
mestic consumers and reduce the overall magnitude of distortions a«ecting
national welfare, policy makers must stabilize world producers' pro¬ts in the
domestic market.
Second, commitment is superior to discretion even when discretionary
policies do not su«er from any in­ationary (or de­ationary) bias. This is
because, given pre-set prices by ¬rms, a discretionary policy maker has an
incentive, ex post, to `over-stabilize' the domestic economy and use mone-
tary policy as to tilt terms of trade in favor of domestic agents. But any
systematic attempt to follow this conduct is doomed to lower domestic wel-
fare on average, as foreign exporters react by pre-setting higher prices in the
domestic market.
Third, relative to the case of suboptimal inward-looking policies, imple-
menting optimal monetary policies reduces exchange rate volatility. With
optimal policies in place, the lower the degree of exchange rate pass-through
and pro¬ts exposure, the lower the equilibrium volatility in the foreign ex-
change market, both in nominal and real terms. There is, however, a case for
exchange rate ­exibility. Fixed exchange rates can be supported by optimal
monetary policies only when all shocks are correlated worldwide or when
local prices are fully inelastic to exchange rate ­uctuations. Otherwise, the
relative price adjustment associated with the implementation of the optimal
policy requires exchange rate ­exibility.
Fourth, the magnitude of gains from cooperation are related in a non-
linear way to the degree of pass-through. In our model there are no welfare
gains from entering international binding agreements either when there are
no deviations from the law of one price or when local prices are completely
insulated from exchange rate ­uctuations. That is, under the extreme as-
sumptions of complete and zero pass-through, monetary policies are strate-
2gically independent and there are no policy spillovers in equilibrium. Yet,
gains from cooperation materialize in economies with intermediate levels of
pass-through.
Building upon our previous contribution (Corsetti and Pesenti [2001]),
we setup a model that can be solved in closed form, without resorting to
(loglinear) approximations. Di«erent from our previous work, as well as
from many other contributions in the `new open-economy' macro literature,
all our welfare results are derived without specifying a particular distribution
of the stochastic disturbances underlying the economy.
Also, our results are derived for intermediate degrees of exchange rate
pass-through. Our analysis thus complements and generalizes recent models
that explore the implications of two polar cases of nominal rigidities. In the
¬rst case (Producer Currency Pricing, or PCP) ¬rms set prices in the cur-
rency of the country where they are located. The domestic price of imports
then moves one to one with the exchange rate, pass-through is 100% and
pro¬ts are completely insulated from exchange rate movements. In the sec-
ond case (Local Currency Pricing, or LCP) ¬rms set the price of their goods
in the currency of the market where they sell their products. The domestic
price of imports does not change with the exchange rate and pass-through
is zero, corresponding to a high degree of pro¬ts' exposure to exchange rate
movements.3
Both PCP and LCP assumptions are extreme in light of the empirical
evidence. Pass-through to export and import prices is generally below 1 but
seldom 0, and a large body of empirical studies have documented that ex-
change rate pass-through is rather low at consumer price level but it is far
from nul at producer price level.4 Our modelling strategy takes imperfect
3For instance, Benigno and Benigno [2000], Corsetti and Pesenti [2001], and Obstfeld
and Rogo« [1995, 2000a,b] focus on the PCP case. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop [2000],
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2000], and Duarte and Stockman [2001] focus on the LCP
case. Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini and Tille [2000], Devereux and Engel [2000], and Tille
[2001] compare PCP and LCP allocations. Devereux, Engel and Tille [1999] consider the
interdependence between a country with zero pass-through and a country with complete
pass-through. A few exceptions include Betts and Devereux [2000a], who study the e«ect
of di«erent degrees of pass-through on exchange rate dynamics in a non-stochastic envi-
ronment, and Monacelli [1999], who simulates numerically the e«ects of pass-through in a
calibration exercise.
4See the discussion in Goldberg and Knetter [1997] and Obstfeld and Rogo« [2000a].
Campa and Goldberg [2000] provide updated estimates of exchange rate pass-through
3pass-through as a proxy for transaction and distribution costs a«ecting ¬rms
pro¬tability in export markets,5 as to analyze the implications of deviating
from the extreme assumptions of zero or full pass-through on the interna-
tional transmission mechanism and the design of optimal monetary policy in
open economy.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sec-
tion 3 summarizes the mechanism of international transmission of real and
monetary shocks implied by the model. Section 4 analyzes optimal policy.
We ¬rst establish a general principle of policy design and discuss it by de-
riving three equivalent representations of the policy problem. Second, we
characterize the optimal monetary rules and discuss their e®ciency under
di«erent degrees of pass-through. Third, we revisit the `rules-vs.-discretion'
debate for an open economy. In Section 5 we assess the case for cooperation
and discuss the choice of exchange rate regimes. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences and technology
We model a world economy with two countries, each specialized in one type of
goods. Countries and types of goods are denoted H (Home) and F (Foreign).
Within a country, the national type of goods is produced in a number of
varieties or brands de¬ned over a continuum of unit mass. Brands are indexed
by h 2 [0;1] in the Home country and f 2 [0;1] in the Foreign country.
All brands are traded worldwide. Each country is populated by households
de¬ned over a continuum of unit mass. Households are indexed by j 2 [0;1]
in the Home country and j£ 2 [0;1] in the Foreign country.
Households consume all brands of both types of goods. Ct(h;j) is con-
sumption of Home brand h by Home agent j at time t; Ct(f;j) is consumption
of Foreign brand f by Home agent j at time t. Similarly we de¬ne consump-
tion of Foreign agent j£ as C£
t (h;j£) and C£
t (f;j£). Each Home brand is an
across countries.
5Obstfeld and Rogo« [2001] emphasize the role of international trade costs in open
economy macroeconomic analysis.
6A recent discussion of the policy implications of ¬rms' pass-through is provided by
Taylor [2000].
4imperfect substitute to all other Home brands, with constant elasticity of
substitution ² > 1. Similarly the elasticity of substitution among Foreign
brands is ²£ > 1. For each agent j in the Home country, the consumption






















Consistent with the idea that each country specializes in the production
of a single type of good, the elasticity of substitution among goods produced
in one country should not be lower than the elasticity of substitution across
goods produced in di«erent countries. Speci¬cally, while both ² and ²£ are
greater than one, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between Home
and Foreign types is one. Under this assumption the consumption baskets of















1 ­ 0 < ­ < 1
(2)
where the weights ­ and 1   ­ are identical across countries.
We denote pt(h) and pt(f) the prices of brands h and f in the Home
market (thus expressed in the Home currency), and p£
t(h) and p£
t(f) the
prices of brands h and f in the Foreign market. The utility-based price of a










Similarly we derive the other price indexes P £
H;t, PF;t and P £





















7The utility based price index PH is de¬ned as the minimum expenditure required to
buy one unit of the composite good CH, given the prices of the brands. See Appendix.
5where ­W ± ­­(1   ­)1 ­.
Each brand h is produced and sold in both countries by a single Home
household (that is, a `yeoman farmer' as in Obstfeld and Rogo« [1996]), using
labor ` as the only input in production.8 Technology is linear in household's














where «t is a country-speci¬c productivity shock. Similarly the resource
















where `£(f) is labor of Foreign household f and «£
t is a productivity shock
in the Foreign country.













where ¬ < 1 is the discount rate and the instantaneous utility U is a positive
function of the consumption index C(j) and real balances M (j)=P and a
negative function of labor e«ort `(j). Utility can be state-dependent, as
indexed by the vector of random variables Ò.
To keep algebraic complexities at a bare minimum, without sacri¬cing













In our framework money demand shocks can be introduced in the form of a
stochastically varying elasticity of real balances, so that Òt = f¿tg.9 In what
8Obstfeld [2000] considers an extension of the model to encompass trade in intermediate
inputs.
9Obstfeld and Rogo« [2000a] include ´t in the set Òt, intepreting the Home elasticity
of labor disutility as a productivity shock. Their parameterization is isomorphic to our
speci¬cation with the Home productivity shock indexed by «t.
6follows, we will refer to Wt as the non-monetary component of Ut, or Wt ±
Ut Et
P1
¼=t ¬¼ t¿¼ lnM¼ (j)=P¼.


























where the discount rate ¬ is the same as in the Home country. Preferences
and velocity shocks can be asymmetric across countries. For instance, in the
baseline model ¿£
t and ´£ in the Foreign country need not coincide with ¿t
and ´ in the Home country.
2.2 Consumer optimization
Given the speci¬cation of the consumption baskets, agent j's demand for








Similar expressions can be derived for the other brands. Accounting for the
demand functions above, we can rewrite the resource constraint for agents h
















Home agents hold Home currency M, and two international bonds, BH
and BF, respectively denominated in Home and Foreign currency. They
receive a revenue R(j) from the sale of the good they produce | since each
agent is the sole producer of a speci¬c brand, we associate individual j with
brand h. They pay non-distortionary (lump-sum) net taxes T, denominated
in Home currency. Using the above speci¬ed consumption and price indexes,
7the individual ­ow budget constraint10 for agent j in the Home country is:
Mt(j) + BH;t+1(j) + EtBF;t+1(j) ´ Mt 1(j) + (1 + it)BH;t(j) +
+(1 + i
£
t)EtBF;t(j) + Rt(j)   Tt(j)   PH;tCH;t(j)   PF;tCF;t(j) (12)
In the expression above the nominal yields it and i£
t are paid at the beginning
of period t and are known at time t   1; E is the nominal exchange rate,
expressed as Home currency per unit of Foreign currency. The sales revenue

























Similar expressions hold for the Foreign country, after associating household
j£ with brand f.
Taking prices as given, Home agent j maximizes (7) subject to (12),
accounting for (11) and (13).11 A similar optimization problem is solved by
Foreign agent j£. In Section 3 we will focus on symmetric equilibria in which
agents are equal within countries (though not necessarily symmetric across
countries), dropping the indexes j and j£ and interpreting all variables in
per-capita (or aggregate) terms.
2.3 Producer optimization and price setting
Our baseline model allows for nominal rigidities, but abstracts from the com-
plexities associated with the dynamics of price adjustment.12 To enhance
analytical tractability, it is assumed that agents set the nominal price of
their product one period in advance, and stand ready to meet (domestic and
10We adopt the notation of Obstfeld and Rogo« [1996, ch.10]. Speci¬cally, our timing
convention has Mt(j) as agent j's nominal balances accumulated during perod t and carried
over into period t+1, while BH;t(j) and BF;t(j) denote agent j's bonds accumulated during
period t   1 and carried over into period t.
11The optimization problem is fully characterized in the Appendix.
12The implications of Calvo-style adjustment of prices are explored in many closed or
small open-economy models mentioned in the references. Benigno and Benigno [2000]
consider the extension to a general equilibrium framework under full exchange rate pass-
through.
8foreign) demand at given prices for one period. The number of producers is
large enough so that ¬rms ignore the impact of their pricing decision on the
aggregate price indexes.
In terms of our notation, Home ¬rms selling in the Home market choose
pt(h) at time t   1. As shown in the appendix, in a symmetric environment
where all prices pt(h) are equal and pt(h) = PH;t, Home ¬rms optimally set
domestic prices such that:




where we de¬ne Ð ± (²   1)=²´. Interpreting (14), domestic ¬rms ¬x prices
equal to expected nominal marginal cost (that is, Et 1 [´«tPtCt]), augmented
by the equilibrium markup ²=(²   1).
To account for the possibility of deviations from the law of one price and
the impact of exchange rate ­uctuations on ¬rms' markups, it is (realistically)
assumed that pass-through to export prices is less than perfect. The simplest




t(h) ± ~ pt(h)E
 ±£
t 0 ´ ±
£ ´ 1 (15)
The variable ~ pt(h) is the predetermined component of the Foreign currency
price of good h that cannot be adjusted to variations of the exchange rate
during period t. Home ¬rms choose ~ pt(h) one period in advance at time
t   1, while the actual p£
t(h) depends on the realization of the exchange
rate at time t. The parameter ±£ indexes the degree of pass-through in the
Foreign markets. For instance, if ±£ = 1, pass-through in the Foreign country
is complete | as in the PCP case. If ±£ = 0, we have p£
t(h) = ~ pt(h) which
coincides with the price chosen by the Home producer in the LCP case.





























Interpreting (16), domestic ¬rms ¬x ~ pt(h) so that at the margin the expected
disutility from an increase in labor e«ort is equal to the expected utility from
consumption ¬nanced by additional sales revenue.
9Analogous expressions can be derived for the pricing by Foreign ¬rms in
the Foreign and the Home market. De¬ne the function:




t , 0 ´ ± ´ 1: (17)
As before, ± = 1 corresponds to PCP, ± = 0 to LCP. The degree of pass-
through in the Home country, ±, need not be equal to that in the Foreign
































where Ð£ ± (²£   1)=²£´£.
In what follows, it will be useful to compare equilibrium prices with and
without nominal rigidities. We denote variables under a ­ex-price equilib-
rium with a flex superscript. If prices were fully ­exible, ¬rms would use
their monopoly power charging a ¬xed percentage over marginal costs. For










In a ¬x-price equilibrium instead, for given PH;t, the pro¬t margin at time t
is not constant, endogenously depending on how macroeconomic and policy
shocks a«ect the marginal cost ´«tPtCt.
Let Ê denote the ratio between the price and marginal cost of a good,
that is the pro¬t margin or markup. Clearly, ¬rms are willing to supply goods
at given prices as long as their ex-post percentage markup is non-negative:
ÊH;t µ 1 , PH;t µ ´«tPtCt (20)
Otherwise, agents would be better o« by not accommodating shocks to de-
mand. In what follows, we restrict the set of shocks so that the `participation
constraint' (20) and its analogs are never violated.
102.4 Government budget constraint and asset markets
The government budget constraint in the Home country is:
Z 1
0
[Mt(j)   Mt 1(j)]dj +
Z 1
0
Tt(j)dj = 0 (21)
where Mt(j) are the money demand functions as determined above.13 Only
Home residents hold Home money. The government a«ects the stock of Home
liquidity by controlling the short-term rate it+1. Similar considerations hold
for the Foreign country, where the government controls the interest rate i£
t+1.























so that, in a symmetric environment, BH;t =  B£
H;t and BF;t =  B£
F;t.
3 The international transmission of real and
monetary shocks
3.1 The solution of the model
We solve the model under the assumption that, at some initial time t0, net
non-monetary wealth is zero in each country, that is, BH;t0 = BF;t0 = 0.
Then, we can study an equilibrium in which non-monetary wealth is zero at
any subsequent point in time: Home imports from Foreign are always equal
in value to Foreign imports from Home. As trade and the current account
are invariably balanced, countries consume precisely their sales revenue:






t = 0 (23)
13The model could easily be extended to encompass government spending and public
debt. Note that ¬scal shocks, modeled as random ­uctuations in government spending,
are isomorphic to productivity shocks in our framework under the assumptions that each
national government spends exclusively on domestically produced goods and utility is
additively separable in private and public consumption. For a detailed treatment of ¬scal
interdependence and the interaction between monetary and ¬scal policies see Corsetti and
Pesenti [2001].
11This stems from the combination of three hypotheses: (i) Cobb-Douglas con-
sumption indexes; (ii) logarithmic consumption preferences; (iii) zero initial
non-monetary wealth. As shown in Corsetti and Pesenti [2001], under PCP
the result holds also when assumption (ii) is relaxed.
Before we derive the general solution of the model, it is analytically helpful
to introduce the variables ¶t and ¶£
t, de¬ned as the reciprocal of the marginal
utility of domestic consumers' nominal wealth.14 Note that, from the Euler










The above expression shows that, given the time path of ¶ (and 1=¶), there
is a corresponding sequence of Home nominal interest rates: Home monetary
easing at time t is associated with both a higher ¶t and a lower it+1. A
similar expression holds for the Foreign country.
Table 1 presents the general solution of the model whereas all endoge-
nous variables (25) through (35) are expressed in closed form as functions of
real and monetary shocks («t, «£
t, ¿t and ¿£
t)15 and the Home and Foreign
monetary stances ¶t and ¶£
t.
Interpreting Table 1: since the equilibrium current account is always bal-
anced, the nominal exchange rate Et in (25) is proportional to PtCt=P £
t C£
t ,
that is, a function of the relative monetary stance. Domestic prices of do-
mestic goods are predetermined according to (26) and (29), while import
prices vary with the exchange rate, depending on the degree of exchange
rate pass-through according to (27) and (28). Given interest rates, money is
determined residually according to (30) and (31). Equilibrium consumption
is determined in (32) and (33), where ÐW is de¬ned as ÐW ± Ð­ (Ð£)
1 ­.
Finally employment levels are determined according to (34) and (35). Note
that it is always the case that:




14That is, ¶t is the reciprocal of the Lagrangean multiplier, denoted by µt in the Ap-
pendix. With logarithmic utility, ¶t is also equal to nominal spending PtCt.
15Recall that the analysis is restricted to shocks whose size does not lower the ex-post
markup below zero.






























































































































































13Under rational expectations, for any given distribution of the shocks and
policy rule, agents optimally predetermine prices so as to stabilize expected
employment at the constant level Ð or Ð£, that we will soon show to be the
­ex-price equilibrium employment.
3.2 The transmission mechanism
The essence of the international transmission mechanism in our model is
captured by three features of the equilibrium allocation in Table 1.
First, for given monetary stances ¶ and ¶£, productivity shocks a«ect cur-
rent employment but neither output nor consumption. The negative response
of employment to productivity shocks is a common ¬nding in the so-called
New Keynesian or New Neoclassical synthesis model.16 Intuitively, nominal
aggregate demand is controlled by the government through monetary policy,
while the CPI is a function of predetermined prices and the exchange rate,
in itself a function of relative monetary stances. In the presence of price
rigidities, for given ¶ and ¶£, an unanticipated shock to the relative supply
of the Home goods cannot be matched by a fall of their relative price: all
prices (26), (28), (27), and (29), are in fact invariant to the realizations of the
productivity shocks. As a consequence, with a given world demand nailing
down the level of output in each country, an increase in productivity simply
lowers employment (34) without a«ecting the supply of goods available for
consumption.
Second, current consumption and employment in each country are non-
decreasing functions of monetary policy shocks abroad. The transmission
of monetary shocks works through both world aggregate demand | which
always increases after a policy shock eases the global monetary stance | and
movements of the terms of trade. A high degree of pass-through (±£ = ± ' 1)
implies that a depreciation of the Home currency is associated with a wors-
ening of the Home terms of trade. The relative price of Home goods falls
in each market, so that more units of Home labor are required to buy one
unit of Home consumption. Correspondingly, the Foreign terms of trade
improve.17 A low degree of pass-through (±£ = ± ' 0) , instead, leads to the
16Gali [1999] provides empirical evidence in support of such a view of the business cycle
e«ects of supply shocks.
17On the `beggar-thyself' vs. `beggar-thy-neighbor' e«ects of exchange rate depreciations
see Corsetti and Pesenti [2001] and Tille [2000].
14opposite result. Local prices are invariant to the exchange rate, but for each
unit of goods sold abroad, Home ¬rms' revenue in domestic currency rises
in proportion to the rate of depreciation. This additional revenue ¬nances
higher consumption, thus leading to higher production and imports. For-
eign exporters now have to supply more goods while su«ering a fall in the
domestic-currency value of their sales revenue.
Third, observe that the level of the Home good price, (27), depends on
Et 1 («t¶t) and is therefore an increasing function of the covariance between
« and ¶. This implies that the systematic tightening of monetary policy
(lower ¶) in response to shocks a«ecting Home producers' marginal costs
(higher «) is associated, in equilibrium, with lower domestic prices PH (and
higher expected utility). Similar considerations hold for the predetermined
component of the Foreign good price in the domestic market, (26): as long
as ± > 1, PF depends on the covariance between Home monetary policy
and Foreign productivity shock. Of course, in the absence of `fundamental'
shocks « and «£, monetary volatility would only have a negative e«ect on
Home expected utility, by increasing the volatility of consumption.18
3.3 The ­ex-price equilibriumbenchmark
Before delving into policy analysis, it is useful to characterize the equilibrium
allocation we would obtain if prices were ­exible. In fact, we will use such
allocation as a welfare benchmark in the rest of the paper. With ­exible
prices, the pricing equations (26) through (29) hold in any state of nature,
not in expectation, so that the degree of pass-through is irrelevant, the law
of one price is valid and purchasing power parity holds. It is easy to verify



























As opposed to the ¬xed-price case, shocks to productivity a«ect output,
not employment. Note that the ­ex-price level of employment is determined
by the magnitude of monopolistic distortions | the competitive level of
Home employment corresponds in fact to 1=´ > Ð. Consumption at Home
18See the considerations in Obstfeld and Rogo« [1998].



















Observe that, ¬rst, consumption and employment are higher in an econ-
omy where global monopolistic distortions ÐW are low. Second, a produc-
tivity shock anywhere in the world economy raises global consumption. To
see why, consider a positive productivity innovation in the Home country.
Employment being constant in equilibrium, such shock raises Home output
and consumption. However, it also lowers the Home goods price, raising the
real income of Foreign consumers. The terms of trade between domestic and













Movements of the terms of trade ensure that the bene¬ts (costs) from a
positive (negative) productivity shock spread around the world. By the same
token, large monopolistic distortions anywhere in the world economy raise
the level of consumption prices worldwide, thus reducing global consumption.
4 A framework for the analysis of monetary
policy in open economy
4.1 The goals of monetary policy
In this section we set and discuss the policy problem faced by a benevolent
policy maker whose welfare objective is the maximization of Home agents'
expected utility. In our analysis, we focus on the non-monetary components
of utility | i.e. we assume that ¿ is arbitrarily small | adopting Et 1Wt
as a measure of national welfare.
4.1.1 The utility-based policy loss function...
Using the ­ex-price solution for consumption (38) with the corresponding ex-
pression (32), we can calculate the gap between expected utility with ­exible
16prices, indexed Wflex, and expected utility with predetermined prices:
Et 1W
flex



























By Jensen's inequality, the gap Et 1W
flex
t   Et 1Wt cannot be negative:
expected utility with price rigidities is never above expected utility with
­exible prices. It follows that, at best, what monetary policy rules can do
is to bridge the gap between the two: a policy rule that minimizes (40) is
also a policy that maximizes the expected utility of the Home representative
consumer.
Below we discuss three equivalent representations of the policy loss func-
tion (40), each contributing to our understanding of the policy problem.
4.1.2 ... can be expressed as a function of expected markups...
First, we equate the policy loss function to an index of markups charged by
producers selling in the Home market. The markup charged by Home ¬rms
on domestic sales and the markup charged by Foreign ¬rms exporting to the



































Using these de¬nitions, it is easy to show that the policy loss function (40) is
equal to the expected value of the (log) average markup in the Home markets,
minus a constant depending on ² and ²£:
Et 1W
flex
t   Et 1Wt = Et 1 [­ lnÊH;t+
+(1   ­)lnÊF;t   ­ ln
²
²   1





17The logic of this result is as follows. Producers optimally set their monopoly
markups and prices given their expectations of future monetary policy. The
higher these prices, the lower the representative consumer's welfare. Under
the constraint of rational expectations, domestic policy makers cannot sys-
tematically push markups below their ­ex-price equilibrium levels; they can,
however, design policy rules aimed at minimizing expected markups when
¬rms set their prices. This goal is achieved by stabilizing producers' income
from the domestic market.
Note that, in the case ± = 1, the markup of foreign producers in the
Home country ÊF;t does not depend on domestic monetary policy. In this
case, Home monetary authorities are only concerned with domestic produc-
ers. Conversely, if ± = 0, ÊF;t does not depend on Foreign monetary policy
| ruling out an important channel of policy spillovers.
4.1.3 ... or a function of the consumer price index under ­exible
and ¬xed prices...
Second, we translate the above index of markups in terms of consumer prices,
with and without nominal rigidities. Expressions for prices of domestic and
foreign goods in the Home country in a ­ex-price equilibrium can be easily
derived from (26) and (27), without the expectation operator. The relation
















Substituting, the policy loss function becomes
Et 1W
flex






The policy loss function is equal to the expected ratio between the ¬xed-price
CPI and the ­ex-price CPI. For any given monetary stance, the consumer
price index under sticky prices cannot be expected to be lower than the CPI
under ­exible prices. We therefore conclude that optimal monetary policy
rules minimize the expected deviation of the (log) CPI from a target given
by the (log) equilibrium CPI under ­exible prices.19
19For a recent analysis of the case for price stability in closed and small open economy
see Goodfriend and King [2000].
184.1.4 ... or a function of output gaps and deviations from the law
of one price
Third, we express (40) in terms of output gaps, in the Home and Foreign
economy, and deviations from the law of one price in each market. With a
linear production function, the output gap can be measured as the distance
between actual and equilibrium employment levels. Using the benchmark
of the ­ex-price allocation, we express the output gap in terms of the ratio
`t=Ð.20
Observe that output gaps for the Home and the Foreign countries can be
easily derived from (34) and (35). Rearranging these expressions and using














Substituting into (43) we can see that the policy loss function is equal to
the expectation of a weighted average of the output gaps, domestically and



















+ (1   ­)ln
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If the law of one price holds, i.e. if ± is equal to 1, the two terms in square
brackets disappear, and the foreign output gap does not respond to domestic
monetary policy. As we will see below, in this case welfare maximization
coincides with closing the domestic output gap and the optimal policy is
fully inward-looking. In general, however, the policy loss function for an
interdependent economy includes more than the domestic output gap | it
also depends on the exchange rate and international cyclical conditions.
20A di«erent measure of output gap is `=(1=´), where the ­ex-price equilibrium alloca-
tion is derived ruling out monopolistic distortion.
194.2 Stabilization and interdependence in the Nash equi-
librium
We are now ready to derive the optimal monetary stances in a world Nash
equilibrium, whereas national policy makers are able to commit to prean-
nounced rules. The policy problem faced by the Home monetary authority is














¼=t as given. Note that this is equivalent to minimizing
the policy loss Et 1W
flex
t   Et 1Wt in (40). The Foreign authority faces a
similar problem. Table 2 presents the closed-form reaction functions, respec-
tively (49) for Home and (50) for Foreign, whose solution is the global Nash
equilibrium. The reaction functions are expressed in three ways: as explicit
functions of shocks and monetary policies; as implicit functions of output
gaps and deviations from the law of one price; and as implicit functions of
the ex-post pro¬t margins.
With an optimal policy in place, the Home monetary stance is eased (¶t
increases) in response to a positive domestic productivity shock (low «t).
Monetary policy is pro-cyclical, in the sense that it accommodates domestic
productivity improvements. Yet, as seen above, in the absence of a policy re-
action a productivity shock would lower employment below Ð | that is, raise
Home potential output above the current level. In light of this observation,
monetary policy leans against the wind and moves to close the employment
and output gaps.
The optimal response of Home interest rates to a Home productivity
shock, however, is not necessarily aimed at closing the output gap completely:
unless ± = 1, ` will not be equal to Ð at an optimum. To gain intuition,
consider two symmetric productivity shocks in the Home country, leading
Home monetary authorities to tighten (if the shock is negative) or to relax
(if the shock is positive) their policy stance. With a negative shock, the
appreciation of the Home currency reduces the revenue of Foreign ¬rms selling
goods at Home, as PF=E falls by a percentage 1   ± with the movement in
the exchange rate. Even though the Foreign ¬rms revenue increases with a
20Table 2: The Nash equilibrium under commitment
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21positive shock, the welfare costs to Foreign agents from a Home monetary
contraction are larger than the gains from higher income in the event of a
Home monetary expansion.
Ex ante, Foreign agents will hedge against the expected loss of sales rev-
enue in the Home market by pre-setting a higher price on their exports,
lowering Home consumption on average. This is why the Home monetary
stance required to close the domestic output gap is not optimal. Relative to
such stance, domestic policy makers can improve utility by adopting a policy
that equates, at the margin, the bene¬t from keeping domestic output close
to its potential level with the loss from lower consumption, as prescribed by
equation (49). The corollary of these considerations is that, in general, opti-
mal monetary rules in a world Nash equilibrium imply smaller exchange rate
volatility vis-² a-vis inward-looking rules focused on domestic developments
regardless of global cyclical conditions.
As long as ± is below one, the Home monetary stance tightens when
productivity worsens abroad and loosens otherwise. Rising costs abroad (an
increase in «£
t) lower the markup of Foreign goods sold at Home. If Home
policy makers were not expected to intervene and stabilize the markup by
hiking rates and appreciating the exchange rate, Foreign ¬rms would charge
higher prices onto Home consumers. Only when ± = 1 Foreign ¬rms realize
that any attempt by the Home authorities to stabilize the markup is bound
to fail as both PF and the exchange rate fall in the same proportion.
Note that, in general, domestic monetary authorities react to Foreign
policy changes: a contraction abroad is matched by an expansion at Home
so that monetary stances are strategic substitutes. The only cases in which
Home monetary policy does not react to Foreign policy are either when ± = 0
or when ± = 1. In the case ± = 1 Foreign interest rate volatility increases the
­uctuations of Foreign marginal costs, thus raising the markup on Foreign
exports. Yet, there is nothing the Home authorities can do to reduce the
volatility of Foreign ¬rms' pro¬ts, since PF=E does not respond to Home
interest rates. In the case ± = 0, instead, movements in the exchange rate
and Foreign marginal costs exactly o«set each other and PF does not respond
to the current exchange rate. Once again, there is nothing for the Home
authorities to stabilize and Home interest rates do not respond to Foreign
policies.
Besides these two extreme cases of PCP and LCP, however, there is always
a rationale for Home policies to react negatively to Foreign policies: a Foreign
22expansion lowers the markup on Foreign exports, requiring a Home monetary
response to sustain the Foreign ¬rms' pro¬ts by appreciating the exchange
rate. Thus, in general, there will be strategic interdependence among policy
makers.21
4.3 Pass-through and Pareto-e®ciency
The utility gap in expression (40) does not depend on monopolistic distor-
tions, whose magnitude is indexed by ÐW. As discussed by Obstfeld and Ro-
go« [2000a], suppose that governments in both countries set non-monetary
instruments (taxes and subsidies) so as to o«set the distortions due to mo-
nopolistic production. If a global monetary policy exists such that the gap
(40) is bridged, such policy would implement the ¬rst-best allocation. Then,
starting from the ¬rst-best allocation, removing taxes and subsidies will lower
the level of both Et 1W
flex
t and Et 1Wt, but will not a«ect the di«erence
between the two. The global monetary policy in place would still be optimal,
and the corresponding allocation would be constrained-Pareto e®cient (that
is, e®cient for the world economy subject to a given level of monopolistic
distortion).
Can monetary rules close the world utility gap completely? In the pres-
ence of asymmetric shocks the answer is negative in all but one important













Monetary authorities optimally stabilize employment at its ­ex-price level
Ð and Ð£.22 Domestic and global consumption optimally co-moves with
productivity shocks according to (38). Thus, the Nash optimal monetary
policy supports the same allocation as with ­exible prices, that is constrained
Pareto-e®cient.
21Betts and Devereux [2000b] examine the problem of international monetary coordina-
tion, in environments of di«ering pass-through, with discretion in policy making.
22Note that, because of our utility parameterization, domestic monetary policy only
responds to domestic shock. This will not be true, for instance, with a power utility of
consumption. Yet, even with power utility the Nash allocation under PCP coincides with
the ­ex-price allocation.
23This result provides an extreme version of the case for ­exible exchange
rates made by Friedman [1953]: even without price ­exibility, monetary au-
thorities can engineer the right adjustment in relative prices through ex-
change rate movements. In our model with PCP, expenditure switching
e«ects makes exchange rate and price movements perfect substitutes.
The Nash equilibrium will however not coincide with a ­ex-price equilib-
rium when the pass-though is less than perfect in either market. Consider for
instance the case of LCP.23 Suppose monetary authorities set interest rates











Note that both monetary policies would react to the same global index of pro-
ductivity shocks. Then, the employment levels would be quite di«erent from

















Only if shocks were global («t = «£
t) would the level of employment be con-
stant. In fact, with global shocks the terms of trade externality disappears,
relative prices need not adjust, and the Nash equilibrium trivially supports
the ­ex-price allocation.
4.4 Commitment vs. discretion in open economy
So far we have assumed that policy-makers worldwide are able to commit to
optimal policies. This section contrasts the policy problem under commit-
ment with the policy problem under discretion. First, we discuss in­ationary
bias in open economy, identifying the determinants of its magnitude and sign.
Second, we show that the optimal policy is not time consistent, even in the
absence of an in­ationary or de­ationary bias.
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¼=t as given. The ¬rst order condition is:





















A similar expression holds in the Foreign country.
4.4.1 In­ationary vs. de­ationary bias
In a closed economy, the presence of monopolistic distortions are clearly asso-
ciated with an in­ationary bias in policy making under discretion. This need
not be true in an open economy. As analyzed in Corsetti and Pesenti [2001],
the bias in policy making may be de­ationary rather than in­ationary if the
economy is su®ciently small so as to su«er from the consumption and welfare
consequences of adverse terms of trade movements. Taking expectations of
both sides of (55), it is clear that a discretionary policy will be subject to
either in­ationary or de­ationary bias in the Home country if:
1   ±(1   ­) ? [­ + (1   ­)±
£]´Ð. (56)
Under discretion, there is an in­ationary bias in Home monetary pol-
icy if the economy is su®ciently `large', in the sense that a large share of
consumption falls on Home products and ­ is su®ciently close to 1. As a
depreciation of the exchange rate a«ects the price of a relatively small share
of consumption goods, policy makers are less concerned with adverse import
price movements than with the distortions associated with monopoly power
in production.
The reverse is true when ­ is su®ciently small and ± and ±£ su®ciently
large. A monetary expansion, while raising output and employment, also
increases the price of a substantial proportion of consumption goods. The
terms of trade movement becomes a dominant concern in discretionary policy
making, leading to a de­ationary bias. Reducing the degree of pass-through
lowers the concern about adverse terms of trade movements associated with
a monetary expansion. For given ­, Ð, and ±£, a lower pass-through in the
domestic market (i.e. a lower ±) is associated with a stronger in­ationary
bias.24
24Recent literature provides evidence of a negative relationship between openness and
254.4.2 Time consistency issues independent of in­ationary bias
Assume now that condition (56) holds as an equality, or (alternatively)
that the government is able to use an appropriate ¬scal instrument to o«-
set the impact of monopolistic distortions,25 so that there is no in­ation-
ary/de­ationary bias in policy making. One may expect that the ¬rst order
conditions of the policy problems under discretion would then coincide with
the ¬rst order conditions under commitment. Comparing (55) and (49), it
is apparent that this is true only in the PCP case (± = ±£ = 1), when ¬rms
pro¬ts are not exposed at all to exchange rate variability. In all other cases,
discretionary policies do not coincide with policies under commitment. The
reason is the following.
Under discretion, for given ¬rms prices, the Home policy maker responds
to domestic productivity shocks and foreign monetary shocks depending on
the degree of pass-through in the Foreign market, ±£, that is relevant for
Home producers/exporters. Ex post, the optimal policy reaction to a shock
moves exchange rates as to tilt the external terms of trade in favor of domes-
tic producers. While optimal ex post, however, this rule ignores the e«ects of
domestic monetary policy on the markup of foreign producers. The variabil-
ity of this markup will be re­ected in the level of domestic prices of Foreign
goods, that are set one period in advance.
The ability to commit to a rule allows policy makers to incorporate these
e«ects in policy design. Under commitment, in fact, the Home policy mak-
ers respond to both Home and Foreign shocks depending on the degree of
pass-through at Home, ±, that is relevant for Home consumers. In other
words, policy makers do not attempt to manipulate terms of trade systemat-
ically (as under discretion). On the contrary, they contain exchange rate and
terms of trade movements as to reduce their e«ects on the income of Foreign
producers, giving up to some extent the stabilization of Home producers'
income. This result of over-stabilization under discretion complements and
extends a similar result discussed in the context of closed-economy models
in­ation in a large cross-section of countries (Romer [1993], Campillo and Miron [1997],
Lane [1997], and Cavallari [2001]). In light of this contribution their empirical ¬ndings
can be interpreted as evidence that the incentive to expand monetary policy is lower in
economies that are more open, and therefore more likely to su«er from the price e«ects
of a depreciating currency. We would expect the degree of pass-through to be a relevant
variable in these empirical models.
25See the discussion in Benigno and Benigno [2000] for the PCP case.
26with staggered price adjustments by ¬rms and in­ation dynamics.26 Our
analysis shows the applicability of the same principle to an open economy,
even in the absence of persistent in­ation dynamics.
5 Implications for international cooperation
and exchange rate volatility
5.1 The case for cooperation
Are there welfare gains from cooperating in the design and implementation of
optimal monetary rules? How are these gains in­uenced by the degree of pass-
through? To address this issue, consider a binding cooperative agreement







Et 1 [¸Wt + (1   ¸)W
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t ] 0 ´ ¸ ´ 1 (57)
where ¸ is a constant parameter indexing the bargaining power of the Home
country. A country's bargaining power is not necessarily related to its eco-
nomic size, so that ¸ need not be equal to ­.
The optimal cooperative policy is the solution to the system below, ex-
pressed in terms of pro¬t margins for notational simplicity:
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26See for instance Gali [2000].
27To verify whether there are gains from cooperation, we can compare the
above system (58)-(59) with the Nash equilibrium (49)-(50) in Table 2. It is
straightforward to verify that the two systems are identical | and therefore
there are no welfare gains from cooperation | in three special cases. The
¬rst | and well known | case is when all shocks are global, i.e. «t = «£
t
for any t. The optimal Nash policies can be written as in (51) with «t = «£
t,
implying a constant exchange rate. Consumption and employment coincide
with the ­ex-price allocation.
The other two cases are PCP | as discussed in Obstfeld and Rogo«
[2000b] | and (perhaps surprisingly) LCP. Under the extreme assumptions
of either complete or zero pass-through, the allocation is the same as whether
or not monetary authorities cooperate, regardless of the value of ¸. We have
established above that these are precisely the case in which monetary policies
are strategically independent of each other. This new result establishes that,
in either case, there are no policy spillovers in equilibrium.
In the case of PCP, we have shown that the Nash equilibrium coincides
with the ­ex-price allocation. This implies that the distortions induced by
nominal rigidities and the monopoly power of a country on its terms of trade
have no welfare consequences: the utility level is the same in each country,
both ex-ante and ex-post.
The absence of gains from cooperation in the case of LCP is less straight-
forward. While there is no strategic interaction among policy makers, one
may expect potentially large spillovers from monetary policy: recall that an
expansion at Home increases Foreign employment without a«ecting Foreign
demand, thus depreciating the Foreign terms of trade between labor and
consumption. Key to our result is that, whether or not monetary authorities
cooperate, the optimal monetary policy in each country cannot be inward-
looking, and must instead respond symmetrically to shocks anywhere in the





























expressions that are satis¬ed by setting ¶ = ¶£. For any given shock, con-
sumption increases by the same percentage everywhere in the world economy.
28Even if ex-post labor moves asymmetrically (so that ex-post welfare is not
identical in the two countries, as is the case under PCP), ex ante the expected
disutility from labor is constant. Thus, expected utility at Home is identi-
cal to expected utility in the Foreign country up to a constant that does
not depend on monetary policy: the Nash and the cooperative allocation
coincide.
Besides such extreme and unrealistic cases, a country can in general do
better than simply `keeping its own house in order' by engaging in binding in-
ternational agreements. Whether these gains are sizable for di«erent degrees
of pass-through, however, remains an open issue left to further research.
5.2 Volatility and exchange rate regimes
In our model the exchange rate remains constant during the period t as
long as ¶t = ¶£
t. It follows that optimal rules can be consistent with a
¬xed exchange rate target provided that the implied monetary stances are
perfectly correlated across countries. Under what conditions will this be the
case?
The Nash equilibrium conditions (49) and (50) are solved by ¶t = ¶£
t
only in two cases: either when «t = «£
t, or when ± = ±£ = 0. In other
words, ¬xed exchange rates can be supported by optimal monetary policies
only when productivity shocks are global, or when there is no pass-through
worldwide. Note that in these two cases a Nash equilibrium will coincide
with a cooperative equilibrium.27 In general, however, the implementation
of optimal policy is not consistent with a ¬xed exchange rate regime.
To what extent will the exchange rate ­uctuate as domestic policy makers
follow optimal rules? Our analysis suggests that exchange rate volatility will
be higher in a world economy close to purchasing power parity, and lower in
a world economy where deviations from the law of one price are large. In
fact, if the exposure of ¬rms' revenue to exchange rate ­uctuations is lim-
ited, inward-looking policy makers assign high priority to stabilizing domestic
output and prices, with `benign neglect' of exchange rate movements. Oth-
erwise, policy makers `think global', taking into account the repercussions of
exchange rate volatility on import prices; hence, the monetary stances in the
27Benigno, Benigno and Ghironi [2000] consider the feedback rules leading to exchange
rate determinacy in a ¬xed exchange rate regime.
29world economy come to mimic each other, reducing currency volatility.
Note that in our analysis we have ignored money velocity shocks ¿t and
¿£
t. In fact, when utility from real holdings is additively separable, money
velocity shocks do not play any role in the determination of consumption
and employment. As (30) and (31) show, for given interest rate policies the
amount of money held by domestic residents adjusts one-to-one to velocity
shocks. In other words, money balances are determined residually in the
model as functions of exogenous shocks and policy variables. An obvious
corollary of this analysis is that, when velocity shocks are the only source of
asymmetric disturbance hitting the two economies, optimal monetary policies
imply that interest rates and exchange rate all remain constant over time.
6 Conclusion
The key message of our contribution is that strict adherence to inward-
looking goals in policy making | such as the stabilization of domestic output
| cannot be optimal in interdependent economies in which ¬rms' revenues
are exposed to currency ­uctuations. Intuitively, producers set higher prices
in response to higher pro¬ts volatility. Unless markups are insulated from
exchange rate movements, inward-looking policies make the pro¬ts of foreign
exporters suboptimally volatile, thus inducing higher average import prices.
At an optimum, the welfare costs from higher consumer prices must equate
the bene¬ts from bringing domestic output towards its potential, ­ex-price
level.
In our study, the degree of pass-through and exchange rate exposure in
domestic and foreign markets emerges as a key element determining the prop-
erties of optimal monetary rules, as well as the welfare features of equilibrium
allocations. Ceteris paribus, economies with higher degrees of pass-through
should be characterized by a higher level of exchange rate volatility and by
monetary stances more closely focused on internal conditions.
A corollary of this principle is that gains from cooperation materialize
only for intermediate levels of pass-through. Interdependent economies gain
little from cooperating in the design of policy rules either when the pass-
through is very high (so that inward-looking policies are fully optimal) or
when it is very low (so that, even without international agreement, domestic
policies respond symmetrically to worldwide cyclical developments).
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34Appendix
Intratemporal allocation. For given consumption indexes, utility-
based price indexes are derived as follows. PH is the price of a consumption















The solution is equation (3) in the main text.
Consider now the problem of allocating a given level of nominal expendi-






p(h)C(h;j)dh = é Z (A.3)






































































which can be rewritten as expression (10) in the main text. Note that:
Z 1
0
p(h)C(h;j)dz = PHCH(j). (A.8)
iIntertemporal allocation. Consider the optimal allocation by Home
agent j. The maximization problem can be written in terms of the following
Lagrangian:




¼ t flnC¼ (j) + ¿¼ lnM¼ (j)=P¼   ´`¼(j)
+µ¼(j)[ BH;¼+1(j) + (1 + i¼)BH;¼(j)   E¼BF;¼+1(j) + (1 + i
£
¼)E¼BF;¼(j)
 M¼(j) + M¼ 1(j) + R¼(j)   T¼(j)   PH;¼CH;¼(j)   PF;¼CF;¼(j)]g (A.9)
where R¼(j) and `¼(j) are de¬ned in (13) and (11). The ¬rst order conditions
with respect to CH;t(j), CF;t(j); BH;t+1(j), BF;t+1 and Mt(j), are, respectively:
­
CH;t (j)
= µt (j)PH;t (A.10)
1   ­
CF;t (j)
= µt (j)PF;t (A.11)
µt (j) = ¬Etµt+1 (j)(1 + it+1) (A.12)









= Et [µt (j)   ¬µt+1 (j)] (A.14)
First, we solve for the multiplier µt(j). Take a geometric average of (A.10)

















iiso that, at the optimum, the individual demand for Home and Foreign con-








Using these expressions, it is easy to verify that
PtCt(j) = PH;tCH;t(j) + PF;tCF;t(j): (A.18)
Combining (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12) the intertemporal allocation of con-
sumption is determined according to the Euler equation:
1
Ct(j)




















The previous expression can be interpreted as agent j's stochastic discount














from which we obtain the risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity linking do-















Note that in the absence of uncertainty the previous condition collapses to






iiiUsing (A.22) we can write:
Mt(j) + BH;t+1(j) =
it+1Mt(j)
1 + it+1










It follows that the ­ow budget constraint (12) can also be written as:
it+1Mt(j)
1 + it+1
+ Et fQt;t+1(j)Wt+1(j)g ´ Wt(j) + Rt(j)   Tt(j)   PtCt(j)
(A.26)
where Wt+1 is wealth at the beginning of period t + 1, de¬ned as:




Optimization implies that households exhaust their intertemporal budget




Et [Qt;N(j)WN(j)] = 0 (A.28)
is satis¬ed, where Qt;N ±
QN
s=t+1 Qs 1;s. If an interior solution exists (as is
the case given our parameterization), the resource constraint (11) holds as
equality as well.
Foreign constraints and optimization conditions. Similar results
characterize the optimization problem of Foreign agent j£. For convenience,














































































































































































Optimal price setting. Optimal pricing in the Home country can be























and, using (A.17), we can rewrite the previous expression as (14) in the main
text.


















































In a symmetric environment with p£
t(h) = P £
























































from which we obtain (16) in the main text.
viEquilibrium. Given initial wealth levels Wt0 and W £
t0 (symmetric among
country residents), and the processes for «t, «£
t, ¿t, ¿£
t, Tt, T £
t , it+1 and i£
t+1
for all t µ t0, the symmetric ¬x-price equilibrium is a set of processes for CH;t,














t , and Et such that,
for all t µ t0 and ¼ > t0, (i) the Home government budget constraint (21) and
its Foreign analog are satis¬ed; (ii) Home consumer optimization conditions
(A.17), (2), (A.21), (A.19), (A.23), (A.20), (11), (13), (A.27), and their For-
eign analogs hold as equalities; (iii) Home ¬rm optimization conditions (14),
(16), (4), and their Foreign analogs hold; (iv) the Home transversality condi-
tion (A.28) and its Foreign analog hold; (v) the markets for the international
bonds clear, that is conditions (22) hold.
A ­ex-price equilibrium is similarly de¬ned, after imposing that for all
t µ t0 Home conditions (14), (16), and their Foreign analogs hold in any
state of nature at time t rather than in expectation at time t   1.
Equilibrium balanced current account. Aggregating the individual
budget constraints and using the government budget constraint we obtain an
expression for the Home current account:
Et fQt;t+1At+1g = At + Rt   PtCt (A.44)
where A is de¬ned as wealth net of money balances, or
At+1 ± Wt+1   Mt, (A.45)
and, by the de¬nition of sales revenue:









Assume now that, at time t0, BH;t0 = BF;t0 = 0 so that initial non-
monetary wealth At0 = 0. It can then be easily showed that, for all t µ t0,
the equilibrium conditions above are solved by the allocation:






t ) = 0, At =  EtA
£
t = 0 t µ t0:
(A.47)






























































































































Nominal equilibrium. The optimal monetary rules derived in the
main text do not provide a nominal anchor to pin down nominal expec-
tations. For instance, recalling the solution for PH;t, we can write the Home




1   ±(1   ­)  


















Now, using (26) we obtain ÐPH;t = Et 1«t¶t but taking the expectation of
(A.49) we obtain Et 1«t¶t = ÐPH;t for any arbitrary choice of PH;t. Similar
considerations hold for (50) and P £
F;t.
To address this issue, following Woodford [2000], take ¶t and ¶£
t de¬ned
by the system (49) and (50) and de¬ne two rules ^ ¶t and ^ ¶£
t such that:

















£ < 0 (A.50)
where ® and ®£are two negative constants, arbitrarily small, and é PH and é P £
F
are the two nominal targets for the Home and Foreign monetary authorities,
viiirespectively. Under the rules above, we obtain:












solved by PH;t = é PH. This implies that, in equilibrium, ^ ¶t is identical to
¶t once we replace PH;t with é PH. Similar considerations allow to pin down
P £
F;t = é P £
F. The government sets a nominal anchor and credibly threatens to
tighten monetary policy if the price of domestic goods deviates from a given
target. Such threat, however, is never implemented in equilibrium.
Equilibrium import prices: some special cases. Given the targets
é PH and é P £
F, we can determine the import prices in both countries according
to the rules (49) and (50). For instance, under PCP the rules (51) imply:









Given é PH, the domestic price of Foreign goods will optimally increase with a
positive productivity shock in the Home country.






















If ± = 1 and ±£ = 0, we have:


























t) + ­«t é P £
FÐ£
µ
.
(A.56)
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